📓 literature/not-one-man-not-one-penny-german-social-democracy-1863-1914.md by @ryan ☆

"Not One Man! Not One Penny!" German Social Democracy, 1863-1914

source : cite:notonemannotonepenny

tags : [[Germany]] [[German Social Democratic Party]] [[Karl Kautsky]] [[history of socialism]]

Introduction

1. German Social Democracy to 1890

The Workers and the Liberals

Lassalle and the ADAV

The Verbund deutscher Arbeitervereine

August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht

Formation of the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei (SDAP)

The [[Franco-Prussian War]] and German Unification

Socialist Unification

The Outlaw Period

2. The Party and the Reich

The Reichstag Electoral System and the SPD

The SPD and Reichstag Elections

Socialists in the Reichstag

The SPD and Foreign Policy

3. The Party and the Trade Unions

Early Social Democracy and Economic Organization

Centralization and Growth of the Trade Unions

Party-Trade Union Relations to 1905

The Mass Strike Controversy and the Mannheim Agreement

Trade Union Influence on Party Policies

4. State Within the State

Party Organization Prior to 1905

Organizational Reforms of 1905

Summary of 1905 reforms

Party Congresses

Party Press

The Making of Socialists

5. Patterns of Regional Development

The SPD in Prussia

The Socialists in Bavaria

6. Theory and Intellectuals

Theoretical Activities to 1890

[[Karl Kautsky]]

[[Eduard Bernstein]]

Initially, Bernstein was not very theoretical. He devoted much of his early time in the SPD to organizing work.

Bernstein became an editor of an important party newspaper, and received personal correspondence with Engels. His editorial line sided with Bebel and Liebkneckt.

Bernstein worked out of Switzerland during the outlaw period, and then once the Reich had pressured Switzerland to expel the German socialists, he moved to London until 1901.

While in London Bernstein came under the influence of English thinkers, and once Engels died, he felt free to publish his own opinions without fear of offending an old friend. His first work is called Evolutionary Socialism.

The author makes the distinction between [[reformism]] and [[revisionism]] /, where the former believes in political action to reform either the party or the state. The latter, according to Bernstein, is the active /revising of Marxist orthodoxy under the auspices that it’s insufficient.

Bernstein ended up rejecting the core of Marxism, in favor of a gradualist approach to achieving socialism.

Many of Bernstein’s initial claims were common sense, and not well-researched. Bernstein was an autodidact, not a trained intellectual. Although is claims proved to be challenging for contemporary Marxists, his claims were also shallow and lacked rigor. He was very harshly criticized, even internationally.

Bernstein’s revisionism took root and could not be rooted out by the party, as the party refused to take a strong stance for or against it.

[[Rosa Luxemburg]]

Luxemburg was one of the very few prominent women in German social democracy, and was an exceptionally talented thinker. Despite this, she was personally very harsh and this tended to isolate her from others. It’s perhaps for this reason, the author speculates, that she has no lasting institutional staying power in German social democracy.

Luxemburg received a doctorate in law in Poland, and became involved in the international socialist movement by means of her ability to speak multiple languages. She was exiled from Poland eventually, and found her way to Germany, having been a close correspondant to Karl Kautsky.

Luxemburg always took the position of radicals, and since the SPD was trying to balance good standing with many political alliances, this meant the party itself would always play a centrist position, obviously antithetical to the radicalism of Luxemburg.

Luxemburg wrote Reform or Revolution in response to Bernstein, arguing that his attitude was petty-bourgeois rather than radical. His reforms had nothing to do with abolishing wage labor.

Luxemburg alienated herself from trade unionists due to something she wrote in Social Reform or Revolution where she says that unions [[can only hope to achieve better working conditions]] in the short term and only locally, and themselves cannot overcome capitalism.

In the debate on the [[mass strike]], Luxemburg’s contribution to the debate can be found in Mass Strike, Party, and Trade Unions.

Much of Luxemburg’s work within the SPD during the middle of the first decade of the 1900s was to push the party in a more radical and active direction.

Luxemburg’s most famous work is The Accumulation of Capital, which deals with capitalist reproduction, which Marx also deals with in [[Capital Vol. 2]] and Vol. 3. She weighs in on [[imperialism]] (she felt that imperialism was not special in terms of the characteristics of capitalism overall) and felt that the role of socialists in an imperialist country were more pressing than those in non-imperialist ones.

The SPD and the [[Second International]]

Prior to the outbreak of the [[First World War]], [[internationalism]] seemed like a unique characteristic of the working class movement, with German social democrats at the forefront of this internationalism.

The SPD was the biggest financier of the Second International.

The SPD almost always had to worry about the reaction from the German state, unlike socialist parties in other European nations.

The question of [[imperialism]] was of utmost importance to the Second International, and the SPD ultimately played a moderating role in this discussion.

According to the author, the SPD contributed to the Second International in the following ways:

  1. Its presence guaranteed that it was taken seriously by the bourgeois world.
  2. The German presence stabilized the otherwise volatile organization.
  3. The strict German attitude of not cooperating with non-socialist forces delayed the growth of reformist positions elsewhere, while not necessarily advocating a more radical direction.

Conclusion

The lack of political unity in the German worker’s movement contributed to the rise of [[Nazism]].

Historians have generally focused on internal weaknesses or failings of the SPD to explain its inability to achieve its espoused ends and to hold the working class together. Some have argued that an opportunistic, reformist leadership sold out the rank and file, betraying socialist principles by not pressing for radical reform in the years before 1914 to 1918. Others have argued that ireresponsible elements of the party’s left wing needlessly imperiled working-class unity and the prospects for meaningful reform by talking revolution and urging putschist activities that could only result in disaster. Leninist critics have found fault with the party’s rather lose organizational structure and its middle-of-the-road theory. More moderate analysts have emphasized the extent to which the radical ideology of the prewar years failed to come to grips with the real gains made by workers during that period.

These arguments all carry some weight. There can be little doubt that, however justified its fears of repression may have been, the reluctance of the SPD leadership to use more aggressive means to pressure for social and political reform severely restricted the ability of the movement to influence developments in Imperial Germany. Similarly, the cumbersome bureaucratic structure that grew up after 1905-1906 clearly isolated the leadership from the sometimes volatile moods of the rank and file. At the same time, if the crisis of interwar Germany was in part the result of the lack of unity in the working class, the problem would only have been exacerbated had the party leadership pursued a more aggressive course earlier; the forces favoring moderation ⸝ and they were formidable ⸺ would have been unlikely to tolerate such a posture.

Given the ambiguous nature of poltics in the Second Reich and the important regional distinctions within the party, as well as the explicit and implicit differences between the party and the trade unions, unity probably could only have been maintained as it was; that is, by studiously avoiding confrontation with the enemy, trying to preseve internal solidarity, and just waiting for the revolution. While there may have been room for tactical variations on specific issues, the general approach of the party could not have been much different.

Ultimately the fact that the party was constantly trying to balance trade union interest and avoid being repressed caused them to take a more moderate approach, and ultimately betray their revolutionary ambitions.

The SPD itself was torn on the question of [[reform vs. revolution]], and as such had an incoherent attitude towards addressing this question.

The SPD as Model

It’s noteworthy that both the [[Second Reich]] and the [[SPD]] were known for their sprawling bureaucracy, leading [[Max Weber]] to conclude that it was a new type of organization.

[[The success of the SPD led to an undermining of its radical activity]].

The SPD probably had one of the most effective propaganda wings of any organization in Germany at the time.

The fact that the SPD had a spurious relationship to formal ideology also caused them to have inconsistent political action sometimes.

[[Lenin]]’s conception of the [[vanguard party]] was a response to the SPD’s strategy of a “party in waiting.”